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A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ANSWERING FOR THE LAFLIR QUESTION
by Jamie Pamela Rasmussen
S n ne initial reviews of the United States
Supreime C<ourt's opinions in Lafler v, Cooper'
and( it cpnanion case Missouri . Frye2 treated
the decisions as either expected or necessary:
as one commentator noted, "The only surprise
about the Supreme Court's recent decisions in
Missouri a. Frye and Lafler a. Cooper is that there
were four dissents."3 Nevertheless, Lafler's dis-
cussion of the remedy for ineffective assistance
of counsel during plea negotiation raised more
questions than it answered. Based on the facts
before it, the Court ordered reinstatement of
the plea offer and gave the trial court discre-
tion regarding sentencing after acceptance of
the guilty plea.4 Yet in announcing that deci-
sion, the Court failed to discuss the contours
of the rule it applied.5 This approach ignored
the history of guilty plea jurisprudence and the
long record of lower court cases that struggled
with the issue of an appropriate remedy to af-
ford a defendant who has received ineffective
assistance of counsel during plea negotiations.
In Frye and Lafler, the Supreme Court
recognized that the criminal justice system is
no longer based primarily on a system of tri-
als. It did so by deciding that prejudice from
1 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
2 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
3 Gerard E. Lynch, Frye & Lafler, No Big Deal, 122
YALE L.J. ONINE 39, 39 (June 21, 2012); see also Craig M.
Bradley, Effective Counsel for Plea Bargains, 48 TRIAL 56,
58 (June 2012); Norman L. Reimer, Frye & Lafler, Much
Ado About What We Do -And What Prosecutors and Judges
Should Not Do, 36 CHAMPION 7, 7 (April 2012).
4 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391.
5 Id. at 1389.
ineffective assistance of counsel can be demon-
strated even if the defendant cannot prove he
would have gone to trial. The Supreme Court,
however, failed to provide adequate guidance
for fashioning a remedy. This failure has left
lower courts without a compass for navigating
the murky waters of providing an appropriate
remedy in these types of cases. Such difficul-
ties gives rise to what one jurist has called "the
Lafler question."6
The Lafler question is narrow in two re-
spects: first, it arises only after the prisoner has
proven ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland 9. Washington;' and second, it arises
only in the context of a lost plea agreement.
That is, the defendant alleges his counsel's in-
effectiveness caused him to reject or miss out
on a favorable plea agreement. Under these
circumstances, the problematic policy issue is
determining the best way to ensure that a de-
fendant's constitutional right to effective as-
sistance of counsel during plea negotiations
is vindicated, while not unduly infringing on
the government's competing interest in the ad-
ministration of justice. In Lafler, the Supreme
Court noted the difficulties in providing such
a remedy but essentially left the determination
to the discretion of the lower courts.
Other commentators have suggested
justifications for the enunciation of a single
specific remedy that would apply in all cases
6 Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577, 595 (6th Cir. 2012)
(Batchelder, J., dissenting).
7 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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presenting a Lafler question.' Yet, as the Su-
preme Court recognized, to enunciate a uni-
form remedy for a problem that could present
itself in myriad ways would unfairly impinge on
competing interests. Thus, instead of offering
a justification for one particular remedy, this
article attempts to provide a framework for an-
swering the Lafler question on its own terms.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Lafler,
trial courts need discretion to fashion appro-
priate remedies to account for the fact that plea
agreements, unlike most trials, determine not
only guilt but also the appropriate sentence in
a single judicial proceeding without the safe-
guards of a full trial on the merits. That dis-
cretion, however, should be guided by explicit
consideration of: one, the government's inter-
est as measured by the nature of subsequent
proceedings; and two, the defendant's interest
as measured by the defendant's actions dur-
ing the plea negotiation. By enunciating these
factors and giving each its appropriate weight,
courts will be able to fashion appropriate rem-
edies for ineffective assistance of counsel dur-
ing plea bargaining, that is, remedies that are
tailored to each case and that do not infringe
upon the competing interests at stake.
To explain the development of such a
rule and how it should be applied, this article
proceeds in four parts. The first two parts ex-
amine the legal background which gave rise to
the problem presented by the Lafler question.
Part I examines the Supreme Court case law
regarding the constitutional validity of guilty
pleas and the evaluation of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims. Part II discusses the
lower courts' struggle to provide remedies for
ineffective assistance of counsel during plea
8 See, e.g., Todd R. Falzone, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel: A Plea Bargain Lost, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 431, 456
(1992) (arguing the remedy should be specific performance);
David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J.
1532, 1553 (2011) (arguing the remedy should be a grant of a
new trial); Aaron K. Friess, Soothsaying with a Foggy Crystal
Ball: A Critique of the U.S. Supreme Court s Remedy for
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When a Criminal Defendant
Rejects a Plea Bargain, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 147, 172 (2012)
(arguing the remedy should be specific performance).
negotiations. Part III then discusses the Laf
ler opinion, showing how it failed to adequately
address the problem of remedy. Finally, Part
IV uses the principles in Lafler and the earlier
lower court cases to create an explicit balancing
test for providing a remedy to a defendant who
has received ineffective assistance of counsel
during plea negotiations.
I. Supreme Court Precedent
In a series of cases decided in the ear-
ly 1970s, the Supreme Court recognized the
changing circumstances surrounding defen-
dants' bargaining power and approved the
practice of plea bargaining.9 These decisions
relied heavily on the availability of competent
representation for the defendant. Despite the
lack of an explicit constitutional guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel during plea ne-
gotiations, such a guarantee is inferred from
the Sixth Amendment, which provides, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel
for his defence."10 The use of the phrase "all
criminal prosecutions" rather than "all criminal
trials" suggests the intention of a broad inter-
pretation. Many Supreme Court decisions also
hinted at a right that applied to proceedings
other than the trial itself." That is, while the
Sixth Amendment is often seen as a guarantee
of trial rights,12 its text is broad enough to en-
9 Albert Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (1979) (citing Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 743 (1970);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970)).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Donna Lee Elm,
Lafler & Frye, Constitutionalizing Plea Bargaining, 36-AUG
CHAMPION 30, 31 (2012) (examining the expansion of the
Sixth Amendment); George Dery & Anneli Soo, Turning the
Sixth Amendment Upon Itself The Supreme Court in Lafler
v. Cooper Diminished the Right to Jury Trial with the Right
to Counsel, 12 CoNN. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 105 (2012) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)).
11 See Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161,
1169 (2012).
12 See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 184 (1986)
("The touchstone of a claim of prejudice is an allegation that
counsel's behavior did something 'to deprive the defendant
44 Washington College of Law Fall 2013
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compass a guarantee of the right to counsel in
a prosecution that ends in a guilty plea because
its guarantee applies in "all criminal prosecu-
tions[.]" While this doctrine was not explicit at
the time the Supreme Court began to develop
rules governing plea negotiations, the Court's
reasoning in the cases relied on the practical
effects of plea negotiations and the presence of
effective assistance of counsel to support the
conclusion that a plea negotiation was not co-
ercive.
For example, in Brady a. United States,"
the Court distinguished a leading Fifth Amend-
ment case by pointing to the fact that the de-
fendant in Brady had the advice of counsel
when deciding whether to plead guilty." That
advice gave the defendant a "full opportunity
to assess the advantages and disadvantages of
a trial as compared with those attending a plea
of guilty," and so "there was no hazard of an im-
pulsive and improvident response to a seeming
but unreal advantage."
The decision in Brady paved the way
for what one jurist has called the administra-
tive system of criminal justice, i.e., a system of
criminal justice based on guilty pleas as op-
posed to trials." The analysis for determining
the validity of a guilty plea in this system was
practical rather than doctrinal. For example,
in North Carolina 9. Alford," a defendant fac-
ing strong evidence of guilt decided to accept
a plea agreement so he would receive a lesser
sentence even though he would not admit he
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."'); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("An accused is
entitled to be assisted by an attorney . . .who plays the role
necessary to ensure that the trial is fair."); see also Dery &
Soo, supra note 10, at 105.
13 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
14 Id. at 754.
15 Id.
16 Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of
Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv 2117, 2118 (1998); see
also Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L.
REv. 715, 720 (2005); Ronald F Wright and Marc L. Miller,
Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargaining, 55 STAN. L REv.
1409, 1409 (2003).
17 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
Criminal Law Practitioner A
was guilty of the offense charged. The Court
discussed the issue of "whether a guilty plea can
be accepted when it is accompanied by protes-
tations of innocence and hence contains only
a waiver of trial but no admission of guilt." 9
The Court concluded a confession of guilt was
not constitutionally necessary to a valid guilty
plea, so long as the record contained strong
evidence of guilt.20 Instead of discussing the
intricacies of Fifth Amendment doctrine, the
Court emphasized the practical effects of the
plea stating, "The Constitution is concerned
with the practical consequences, not the formal
categorizations, of state law."21
The next important decision in the de-
velopment of the Supreme Court's plea nego-
tiation theory was Tollett 9. Henderson.22 In Tol-
lett, the defendant, advised by counsel, pleaded
guilty to first-degree murder and was sen-
tenced to ninety-nine years in prison.23 Many
years after his conviction, the defendant chal-
lenged his conviction through a federal habeas
corpus action, arguing he had been deprived
of his constitutional rights because African-
Americans had been systematically excluded
from the grand jury that returned the indict-
ment against him. 24 In the district court, the
defendant focused on the fact that his lawyer
failed to inform him of the possibility of a suc-
cessful challenge; the court of appeals held that
based on this lack of knowledge, there could be
no valid waiver.25
The Supreme Court reviewed the case
to determine "whether a state prisoner, plead-
ing guilty with the advice of counsel, may later
obtain release through federal habeas corpus
by proving only that the indictment to which he
pleaded was returned by an unconstitutionally
selected grand jury."26 The majority answered
18 Id. at 27-28.
19 Id. at 33.
20 Id. at 37.
21 Id.
22 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
23 Id. at 259.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 260.
26 Id.
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that question in the negative by relying on
Brady.27 The Supreme Court opined that the
court of appeals interpreted Brady and its com-
panion cases too narrowly.28 Those cases were
not simply about whether a guilty plea after an
involuntary confession was invalid; instead, the
reasoning in those cases applied in any case
where the "petitioner alleged some deprivation
of constitutional rights that preceded his deci-
sion to plead guilty."29 Thus, to be entitled to
relief after a guilty plea, the petitioner would
have to prove a constitutional violation and that
his counsel's "advice was not 'within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in crim-
inal cases[.]"'" Under this reasoning, almost
all challenges to guilty pleas became, of neces-
sity, challenges alleging ineffective assistance of
plea counsel.
These decisions implicitly recognized
the differences between a criminal justice
system that makes the factual determination
of guilt via trial and a criminal justice system
that makes the factual determination of guilt
via plea. In the latter, prosecutors serve two
functions: first, they make the initial determi-
nation of guilt;1 second, they determine what
sentence is appropriate.32 Unfortunately, this
allocation of authority does not comport with
the traditional norms of our system of jus-
tice." The result is that the procedures that
govern the finding of guilt and the imposition
of sentences i.e., plea negotiations are very
informal and not always followed. While plea
negotiations can provide powerful opportuni-
ties for zealous defense counsel to improve the
position of his or her client," the informality of
the process makes it even more difficult than
in trial situations to determine what constitutes
effective representation. Furthermore, as the
system hinged on the availability of competent
27 Id. at 267.
28 Tollett, 411 U.S. at 265.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 266.
31 Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of
Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2117, 2123 (1998).
32 Id. at 2127.
33 Id. at 2124.
34 See id. at 2129.
counsel for the defense, it was inevitable that
defendants would begin to challenge their at-
torneys' performance.
Thus, the next step in the development
of the administrative system of criminal jus-
tice was enunciating standards for determining
when a criminal defendant had received inef-
fective assistance of counsel. When the Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of evaluating
the effectiveness of counsel during plea nego-
tiations in Hill 9. Lockhart,"' it went back to fa-
miliar ground. Although the opinions in Brady
Alford, and Tollett had begun to recognize that
plea negotiations were best governed by practi-
cal considerations, the analysis in Hill 9. Lock-
hart looked to the constitutional guarantee of
a fair trial to provide guidance for evaluating
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel prior
to a guilty plea. At the same time, the decision
in that case set the stage for the conflict that
would create the questions presented in Lafler
and Frye.
In Hill 9. Lockhart, the Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether a post-con-
viction movant was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on a claim for post-conviction relief.
The movant claimed his guilty plea was invol-
untary because his attorney had failed to advise
him that the applicable law would require him
to serve fifty percent of the sentence he would
receive after the guilty plea before he would
become eligible for parole." In addressing this
question, the Court first looked at whether the
standard enunciated in Strickland 9. Washington
applied in the context of guilty pleas and de-
termined that it did for two reasons: one, in
both types of cases the government was unable
to prevent ineffective assistance of counsel and
two, in both types of cases the public had the
same interest in the finality of a conviction.37
Based on this reasoning, and without discus-
sion of the ways in which determination of guilt
by plea negotiations is different from determi-
nation of guilt by trial, the Court decided the
35 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
36 Id. at 53.
37 Id. at 57-58.
46 Washington College of Law Fall 2013
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same test for ineffective assistance of counsel
applied in cases where guilt was determined by
plea as in cases where guilt was determined by
trial.
In addressing the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test, the Court in Hill relied primar-
ily on the trial model of the criminal justice
system. The Court stated the determination
"focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally
ineffective performance affected the outcome
of the plea process."38 It attempted to clarify
this pronouncement by stating that "in order
to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the de-
fendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial."' 9 Since the defen-
dant in Hill did not allege he would have gone
to trial, the Supreme Court held that the lower
court did not err in denying the claim without
an evidentiary hearing. Thus, the result in the
Hill case suggested a defendant had to prove
he would have gone to trial in order to prove
prejudice from ineffective assistance of coun-
sel during plea negotiations. At the same time,
the broader language regarding a different re-
sult left open the possibility of other tests for
prejudice.
Where a conviction is the result of a
guilty plea, the most critical phase of the pros-
ecution is not the presentation of evidence or
the cross-examination of the government's star
witness, but the decision of the terms on which
the defendant will plead guilty.40 A guilty plea,
unlike a trial, is the result of a negotiation. Af-
ter a jury trial, assuming there has been no
significant error in the trial, the conviction is
supported by the decision of a group of twelve
citizens who believed the evidence proved the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.4 1
38 Id. at 59.
39 Id.
40 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
41 See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397-98
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting "there is no doubt that
the respondent here is guilty of the offense with which he
was charged" because "he has received the exorbitant gold
standard of American justice-a full-dress criminal trial
Criminal Law Practitioner
No such assurances exist in the case of a guilty
plea. Furthermore, after a trial, the govern-
ment has expended considerable resources
prosecuting the defendant. 42  These factors
alter the interests at stake when evaluating a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.43 Be-
cause the Court in Hill did not pause to con-
sider the ways in which a plea of guilty differs
from a trial finding of guilt, the Court enunci-
ated a test for ineffective assistance of counsel
that did not effectively balance the interests at
stake. This situation caused much confusion in
the lower courts.
II. Lower Court Confusion
After Hill, lower courts split regarding
which test to apply to determine whether a de-
fendant who had pleaded guilty was prejudiced
by his attorney's deficient performance. Some
courts followed the more general statement
that prejudice was shown when the deficient
performance affected the outcome of the plea
process.4 4 Other courts took a more narrow ap-
proach, relying on the Supreme Court's hold-
with its innumerable constitutional and statutory limitations
upon the evidence the prosecution can bring forward"); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (noting that proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt "is a prime instrument for reducing
the risk of convictions resting on factual errof').
42 See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388-89 ("The reversal of
a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors,
witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to
expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a
trial that has already taken place[.]") (quoting United States v.
Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986)).
43 See Ana Maria Gutierrez, The Sixth Amendment:
The Operation ofPlea Bargaining in Contemporary Criminal
Procedure, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 695, 703 (2012).
44 See, e.g., Riggs v. Fairman, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1141,
1150 (C.D. Cal 2001) (noting that "a large body of federal
case law holds that a defendant who rejects a plea offer
due to improper advice from counsel may show prejudice
under Strickland even though he ultimately received a fair
trial.") (quoting Wanatee v. Ault, 259 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir.
2001)); Carmichael v. Colorado, 206 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo.
2009) (holding that to prove prejudice the defendant "must
demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, he would have accepted the plea offer rather
than going to trial"); see also Illinois v. Curry, 687 N.E.2d
877, 879 (Ill. 1997) (finding prejudice where the defendant
was not made aware of mandatory consecutive sentences if
found guilty at trial).
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ing in the Hill. Those courts found prejudice
could not be proven after a guilty plea unless
the petitioner would have insisted on trial."
This conclusion was also supported by the
proposition that the right to effective assistance
of counsel was a right designed merely to assist
the defendant in obtaining a fair trial.4" Thus,
if the defendant obtained a fair trial, he could
not have been prejudiced by any ineffective as-
sistance of counsel during the plea negotiation
stage.
This split in authority over how to de-
termine prejudice after ineffective assistance
of counsel in the plea negotiation phase also
resulted in discrepancies in the appropri-
ate remedy afforded to defendants who could
prove their attorneys had been ineffective.
The lower courts dealt with the complex prob-
lem of providing a remedy to a defendant who
received ineffective assistance of counsel but
nevertheless was convicted after fair proceed-
ings in a variety of ways. The most common
remedies ordered in cases of lost plea bargains
include ordering a new trial, ordering the gov-
ernment to reoffer the plea, or ordering specif-
ic performance of the lost plea bargain. Each
of these remedies, if chosen as the exclusive
remedy for cases presenting a Lafler question
would strike an unfair balance between the de-
fendant's interests and the government's inter-
ests because they do not take into account the
manner in which the balancing of the parties'
interests differ after a trial as opposed to after
45 See, e.g., United States v. Miell, 711 F. Supp. 2d 967,
988 (N.D. Iowa 2010); Beachv. Missouri, 220 S.W.3d 360,
364 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
46 See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 184 (1986);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Beach,
220 S.W.3d at 364; see also George Dery and Anneli Soo,
Turning the Sixth Amendment upon Itself The Supreme Court
in Lafler v. Cooper Diminished the Right to Jury Trial with
the Right to Counsel, 12 CoNN. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 105 (2012);
Donna Lee Elm, Lafler and Frye: Constitutionalizing Plea
Bargaining, 36 CHAMPION 30, 31 (2012).
47 Todd R. Falzone, Note, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel: A Plea Bargain Lost, 28 CAL. W.L. REV. 431, 442-43
(1992) (discussing In re Alvernaz, 282 Cal. Rptr. 601 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991)).
48 Riggs v. Fairman, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1151-52
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (collecting cases).
a guilty plea.
Ordering a new trial is by far the most
popular of these options." The reasoning for
such a remedy is generally based on the prem-
ise that a new trial returns the parties to a stage
prior to any constitutional error." The corollary
of this reasoning is that ordering a new trial al-
lows resumption of plea bargaining with effec-
tive assistance of counsel for the defendant.,"
A second fairly popular remedy is specific per-
formance of the lost plea offer.52 Some courts
reasoned specific performance is an authorized
remedy and made an analogy to Santobello.3
In support of this analogy, courts asserted the
remedy was narrowly tailored and restored the
defendant to the position he would have been
in without the constitutional error.5 4
Somewhere between the remedy of or-
dering a new trial and ordering specific perfor-
mance of the lost plea agreement was the rem-
edy of ordering the government to reinstate
the plea offer."" Generally, courts choosing this
49 See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376
(2d Cir. 1998); Riggs, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (citing In re
Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at 759); Carmichael v. State, 206 P.3d 800
(Colo. 2009); In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 759 (Cal. 1992);
Pennsylvania v. Napper, 385 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976);
Revell v. Florida, 989 So.2d 751 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008);
Feldpausch v. Florida, 826 So.2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
50 See, e.g., Riggs, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1154;
Carmichael, 206 P.3d at 809. Other cases employing this
remedy offer little or no reasoning for their choice of remedy.
See, e.g., Napper, 385 A.2d at 524; Revelle, 989 So.2d at 753.
51 See Riggs, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 ("The parties then
will be free to engage in plea bargaining or to decline to do
so."); Curry, 687 N.E.2d at 890 ("The remedy of a new trial
may include the resumption of the plea bargaining process.");
Carmichael, 206 P.3d at 810 ("[T]he parties may, of course,
reengage in plea negotiations.").
52 See, e.g., Williams v. Maryland, 605 A.2d 103 (Md.
1992); Alvernaz v. Ratelle, 831 F. Supp. 790 (S.D. Cal 1993);
Bectonv. Hun, 516 S.E.2d 762 (W.Va. 1999); Sanders v.
Comm'r of Corr., 851 A.2d 313 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004); Ebron
v. Comm'r of Corr., 992 A.2d 1200 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
53 Ebron, 992 A.2d at 1215.
54 Id. at 1217; Williams, 605 A.2d 110-11; Becton, 516
S.E. 2d at 768.
55 See, e.g., Tucker v. Holland, 327 S.E.2d 388 (W. Va.
1985); Iowa v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671 (Iowa 1986); Ex parte
Lemke, 13 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); United States
v. Carmichael, 216 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2000); Turner v. Texas,
48 Washington College of Law Fall 2013
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remedy did so because other remedies were
unsatisfying. For example, in Iowa v. Kraus, the
Supreme Court of Iowa held that a new trial
was not appropriate because it did not restore
the lost chance of a bargain and specific per-
formance was not appropriate because if a de-
fendant knew that was the remedy, there would
be no risk for a defendant who chose to go to
trial."6 In economic terms, if the law provid-
ed specific performance as a remedy, then the
defendant could demand the government ex-
pend resources on a trial and yet still obtain
the benefit of a plea agreement in the form of
a sentencing discount that was supposed to re-
flect the savings the government obtained from
not having to go to trial. Additionally, the court
in Ex parte Lemke reasoned that reinstating a
plea offer put the defendant in the position he
would have been in had the constitutional vio-
lation not occurred."
A frequently overlooked option is the
option of resentencing. "8 In Davie v. South
Carolina, defense counsel failed to convey a fa-
vorable plea offer and the defendant pleaded
guilty under a later, less favorable offer." The
court held that a new trial would not be an ap-
propriate remedy because the defendant never
indicated he wanted to go to trial.60 On the oth-
er hand, the court found specific performance
would also not be an appropriate remedy be-
cause the defendant could not have relied on
the earlier, more favorable offer or any advice
related to the offer in his later decision to plead
guilty. Davie differs from earlier remedy cases
because it examined the particular facts in the
case before the court rather than doctrinal con-
siderations.
Other cases that have come closer to the
appropriate remedy also rely on the particu-
49 S.W.3d 461 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Leathermanv. Palmer,
583 F. Supp. 2d 849 (W.D. Mich. 2008).
56 Kraus, 397 N.W2d at 674.
57 See, e.g., Lemke, 13 S.W3d at 797-98; see also
Leatherman, 583 E Supp. 2d at 871.
58 See, e.g., Davie v. South Carolina, 675 S.E.2d 416 (S.C.
2009).
59 Id. at 605-06.
60 Id. at 615.
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lar facts and circumstances of the case before
them, but they begin their analysis by skipping
the Supreme Court's guilty plea jurisprudence
and relying on general Sixth Amendment prin-
ciples. For example, in UnitedStates 9. Gordon,"
the court, relying on the balancing test enunci-
ated in UnitedStates v. Morrison,62 considered the
following factors: whether a subsequent trial
was infected with constitutional error, whether
the witnesses would be available for a new trial,
and a comparison of the time already served
by the defendant with the sentence in the lost
plea bargain." The court found the trial had
not been infected with constitutional error but
there was no significant lapse of time between
the first trial and the collateral attack.64 Because
of the short period of time between the crimi-
nal trial and the collateral attack, there were no
significant practical barriers to a retrial." The
court found that a new trial was an appropriate
remedy in such a case.
Some courts, most notably those that
found no prejudice where the defendant could
not prove he would have gone to trial, would
order no remedy. At first, this might seem to
be problematic. In his dissent in Lafler, Jus-
tice Scalia expressed disdain "that the remedy
could ever include no remedy at all." This is
less of a problem than it appears. The require-
ment of proving prejudice itself recognizes that
not all constitutional violations are so egre-
gious as to require reversal of a conviction.
Furthermore, in many cases, courts affirm con-
victions despite improper procedures. A con-
viction may stand despite a constitutional error
if that error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 9 In some cases, as will be shown be-
61 156 F3d 376 (2d Cit 1998).
62 499 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
63 Gordon, 156 F3d at 381.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 381-82.
66 Id. at 382.
67 Laflerdv. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
68 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 689 (1984).
69 See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967) (stating the standard for reviewing whether or not
a constitutional error is harmless is whether the error was
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low, no remedy will be appropriate even if the
defendant can show he would have received a
better outcome based on the lost plea bargain.
The proliferation of remedies demon-
strates the confusion created by the Supreme
Court's guilty plea jurisprudence. The Court
at first carefully delineated the various func-
tions and doctrinal justifications for the prac-
tice. Then, as the differences between the trial
system and the guilty plea negotiation system
became more apparent, the Court abandoned
the doctrinal justifications one by one with-
out providing alternative guidelines. The only
guidance was the central importance of effec-
tive assistance of counsel. The decision in Hill
inadequately addressed the problem of inef-
fective assistance of counsel during plea nego-
tiations by failing to recognize the difference
between plea negotiations and trial as a mech-
anism for proving guilt. The Supreme Court
began to recognize that important difference in
Frye and Lafler.
III. Laf1er and Frye
In Missouri .Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, the
Supreme Court definitively resolved the split
regarding the appropriate test for determining
prejudice after finding ineffective assistance of
counsel during plea negotiations. In each case.
the defendant satisfied the first prong of the
Strickland test so the only issue remaining was
a determination of prejudice. Thus, in each
case, the Court had to determine what facts a
defendant had to prove to show prejudice aris-
ing from ineffective assistance of counsel dur-
ing plea negotiations. While this was an im-
portant step forward, the Court obscured the
different interests at stake by using the phrase
"constitutionally adequate procedures." If the
Court had used the phrase "a fair trial" or "a
constitutionally valid guilty plea" it would have
drawn attention to the different interests at
stake in each situation and would have made it
easier to craft an appropriate remedy.
The defendant in Frre had been charged
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
with driving with a revoked license, an offense
for which he had been convicted three times
before. For that reason, the fourth offense was
a felony and it carried a maximum possible
punishment of four years in prison.70 The pros-
ecutor offered a choice of plea offers with an
expiration date, and defense counsel failed to
inform his client of those offers prior to their
expiration date. When the defendant was sub -
sequently arrested for the same offense, he de-
cided to plead guilty to the first charge with-
out the benefit of a plea agreement. The court
imposed a three-year prison sentence.1 In his
state-level post-conviction case, Frye argued he
had received ineffective assistance of counsel
when his attorney failed to inform him of the
initial plea offer before it had expired.7 2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine the appropriate standard for de-
termining prejudice arising from ineffective as-
sistance of counsel in a case involving the entry
of a guilty plea." The Court discussed Strick-
land, Hill, and Padilla, distinguishing the latter
two. It noted that in Hill and Padilla the plea
was entered based on erroneous advice, while
the defendant in Frye received correct advice.
The Court stated, "The challenge is not to the
advice pertaining to the plea that was accepted
but rather to the course of legal representation
that preceded it with respect to other potential
pleas and plea offers." 4 In rejecting the gov-
ernment's argument that the entry of a knowing
and voluntary plea cured any prejudice arising
from prior errors, the Court emphasized the
prevalence of guilty pleas in today's criminal
justice system to support its conclusion that
the plea process must be fair.
Instead, relying on Glover 9. United States," the
Court held that "[t] o establish prejudice in this
instance, it is necessary to show a reasonable
probability that the end result of the criminal
process would have been more favorable by
70 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012).
71 Id. at 1404.
72 Id. at 1405.
73 Id. at 1404.
74 Id. at 1406.
75 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001).
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reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence
of less prison time."" The Court also relied
heavily on the general Strickland test for preju-
dice, i.e., whether in the absence of the errors
of counsel "the result of the proceeding would
have been different."" Based on this analysis,
the Court determined that the relevant issue in
the case was whether the plea agreement would
have resulted in a lesser sentence; this required
analysis of whether the prosecutor would have
withdrawn the agreement and whether the trial
court would have been obligated to accept it.
The Court remanded those questions for con-
sideration by the lower court.
In Lafler, defense counsel advised the
defendant in an attempted murder case to re-
ject a plea agreement. The attorney explained
that the government could not prove the de-
fendant intended to kill the victim because the
victim had only been shot below the waist.
The defendant proceeded to trial, was con-
victed, and received a harsher sentence than
he would have received under the rejected plea
agreement. The defendant sought state post-
conviction relief, claiming his counsel was in-
effective in advising him to reject the plea of-
fer, and the state court denied the claim on the
grounds that the defendant had made a know-
ing and voluntary decision to proceed to trial.
He renewed his claims in a federal habeas cor-
pus action, and the federal district court grant-
ed relief, ordering specific performance of the
original plea offer. 9
The Supreme Court again rejected the
government's reliance on Hill, stating that
"here the ineffective advice led not to an offer's
acceptance but to its rejection."80 The Court re-
jected the related argument that there could be
no Strickland prejudice because the defendant
had received a fair trial. The Court concluded
that far from curing the error, the trial caused
76 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409.
77 Id. at 1410.
78 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
79 Id. at 1383-84.
80 Id. at 1385.
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the injury from the error."' In summarizing its
rejection of the government's arguments, the
Court further laid bare the rationale underly-
ing its decision:
In the end, petitioner's three argu-
ments amount to one general con-
tention: A fair trial wipes clean any
deficient performance by defense
counsel during plea bargaining.
That position ignores the reality that
criminal justice today is for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system
of trials. Ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four
percent of state convictions are the
result of guilty pleas. As explained
in Frye, the right to adequate assis-
tance of counsel cannot be defined
or enforced without taking account
of the central role plea bargaining
plays in securing convictions and
determining sentences.8 2
That is, the Court justified its decision primar-
ily on the practical functioning of the criminal
justice system rather than on doctrinal consid-
erations. However, the mere fact that most con-
victions are obtained by guilty plea does not
mean that the interests that must be balanced
to remedy ineffective assistance of counsel af-
ter a guilty plea are the same as those existing
after a trial.
The Court's discussion of the prevalence
of guilty pleas is important for two reasons: one,
it recognizes the administrative nature of our
current system of criminal justice; and two, it
paves the way for development of more appro-
priate standards standards that are not based
on the assumption that the trial is the norma-
tive procedure. The discussion stopped short
of a clearly enunciated test for determining the
appropriate remedy. In Frye, the Court did not
address the issue of remedy, and in Lafler it did
so only briefly. This difference, as Justice Sca-
lia points out in his dissent, may account for
the Court's lack of clarity when it comes to a
81 Id. at 1386.
82 Id. at 1388 (citations omitted).
Fall 2013 Washington College of Law 51
9
Rasmussen: A Proposed Framework for Answering for the <em>Lafler</em> Questi
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
Criminal Law Practitioner
remedy.83
In Lafler, the Court began its discus-
sion of remedy with general Sixth Amendment
principles, quoting United States 9. Morrison.
The goal of the remedy is to 'neutralize the
taint' of a constitutional violation, while at the
same time not grant a windfall to the defen-
dant or needlessly squander the considerable
resources the State properly invested in the
criminal prosecution. "84 The Court then noted
the injury the defendant suffered could be a
greater sentence to the same charges, or a con-
viction of more charges than under the lost plea
agreement; therefore, different remedies would
be appropriate in different circumstances.8 " It
held, "Principles elaborated over time in deci-
sions of state and federal courts, and in statutes
and rules, will serve to give more complete guid-
ance as to the factors that should bear upon the
exercise of the judge's discretion."" The Court
did mention two factors that should be con-
sidered: the defendant's willingness to plead
guilty and the existence of new information
discovered after the lost plea bargain." Then,
without analysis, the Court simply stated, "The
correct remedy in these circumstances ... is to
order the State to reoffer the plea agreement."88
The decisions in Lafler and Frye ad-
vanced the state of the law by acknowledging
that a trial is not the normative procedure for
determining guilt and refusing to base the test
for prejudice on the issue of whether the de-
fendant can prove he would have gone to trial.
Unfortunately, the opinions in those cases do
not recognize important differences between a
conviction and sentence based on a guilty plea
and a conviction and sentence based on a trial.
Any balancing test must consider these differ-
ences yet the Supreme Court glossed over such
differences by looking at the constitutional re-
quirements rather than the practical effects.
83 Id. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388-89
(2012) (citations omitted).
85 Id. at 1389.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391.
This disconnect gave the Court little to work
with when it tried to enunciate factors for de-
termining the remedy. The lower courts that
have addressed the Lafler question have looked
at those differences and granted different rem-
edies accordingly. Thus, a balancing test for
answering the Lafler question can be seen by
applying the factors enunciated in Lafler to the
results from the lower court cases.
IV. Proposed Details for the Balancing Test
In Lafler, the Supreme Court suggested
a factor-based, totality of the circumstances test
to determine the remedy in cases of ineffective
assistance of counsel in plea negotiation but
did not explain how the factors and circum-
stances should be balanced. The skeleton of
an appropriate balancing framework can be
seen by looking at the lost plea agreement and
the subsequent proceedings to determine what
factual questions were resolved and then de-
termine a remedy that balances the interests
implicated by those facts.
In determining a remedy, many cases,
including Lafler," begin with a discussion of
Supreme Court precedent in United States .
Morrison.9o In Morrison, federal agents spoke to
the represented defendant in a drug case with-
out her attorney's knowledge.9 ' The defendant
entered a conditional guilty plea and raised a
Sixth Amendment challenge on appeal. The
Third Circuit found a violation and ordered
dismissal of the indictment as a remedy. The
government appealed. The Supreme Court as-
sumed a Sixth Amendment violation and went
on to discuss the appropriate remedy. The
Court began by noting the importance of both
the right to counsel and the government's inter-
est "in the administration of criminal justice."92
89 Id. at 1388.
90 449 U.S. 361 (1981); see, e.g., Turnerv. Tennessee,
858 F.2d 1021, 1207 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that remedies
for the deprivation of the right to the effective assistance of
counsel "should be tailored to the injury suffered from the
constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe
on competing interests") (quoting Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364).
91 Morrison, 449 U.S. at 362-63.
92 Id. at 364.
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The Court continued, stating, "Cases involving
Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to
the general rule that remedies should be tai-
lored to the injury suffered from the constitu-
tional violation and should not unnecessarily
infringe on competing interests." It noted
that instead of dismissing the indictment, the
proper approach was "to identify and then neu-
tralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate
in the circumstances to assure the defendant
the effective assistance of counsel and a fair
trial."94 The Court reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals, observing that in other con-
stitutional cases, the remedy is not dismissal of
the charges but is "limited to denying the pros-
ecution the fruits of its transgression."9 5
From this case, two important general
principles emerged for determining the ap-
propriate remedy for a Sixth Amendment vio-
lation. First, the remedy must be tailored to
the violation alleged. Second, in cases where
the government is not at fault, the interests
of the government must be given more con-
sideration than in cases where the violation
was based on government wrongdoing.96 This
suggests the appropriate analysis of the Lafler
question must consider what type of proce-
dures occurred after the lost plea agreement
because those procedures reveal the strength
of the government's interest. If the subsequent
proceedings involved a guilty plea, the govern-
ment's interest is lower because it expended
fewer resources, while the defendant's interest
is greater because he waived important proce-
dural rights.
Morrison also states that a remedy must
neutralize the taint of the constitutional viola-
tion.9 Thus, it is imperative to consider how
the constitutional violation wronged the defen-
93 Id.
94 Id. at 365.
95 Id. at 365-66.
96 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693
(1984) (holding that a prisoner seeking relief based on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel must affirmatively prove
prejudice in part because the government is not able to prevent
the constitutional violation).
97 Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365.
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dant. As the Court stated in Lafler, one factor
to consider is the defendant's prior expressions
of a willingness to plead guilty," but the Court
did not explain how it should be weighed. This
creates confusion for practitioners. Below, the
weight to be given to these factors is assessed
in light of the practical effects of each possible
remedy.
A. Specific Performance as a Remedy
Specific performance is almost never an ap-
propriate remedy for ineffective assistance of
counsel during plea negotiation. One popular
justification for specific performance as a pos-
sible remedy is to make an analogy to Santobel-
lo." However, an analogy to Santobello is grossly
inappropriate in cases involving ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. In Santobello, the govern-
ment breached a plea agreement to stand silent
at sentencing.100 That is, the prosecution bore
moral responsibility for the violation of the de-
fendant's rights. In the case of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel, however, the government
does not bear such moral responsibility.10 1
An analogy between cases where there
is prosecutorial fault and cases where there is
no prosecutorial fault ignores the precept that
the remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel
must be narrowly tailored and not unduly in-
fringe on competing interests. 102
Furthermore, the underlying assump-
tion in Santobello that plea negotiation is like
98 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
99 See, e.g., United States. v. Blaylock, 20 E3d 1458, 1468
(9th Cir. 1994); Arizona v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193, 1206 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2000); Ebron v. Comm'r of Corr., 992 A.2d 1200,
1215 (Conn. Ct. App. 2010); cf United States v. Gordon, 156
E3d 376, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that while specific
performance may be appropriate where there are obstacles to
a new trial, such logic is not necessarily applicable in other
circumstances); Davie v. South Carolina, 675 S.E.2d 416, 423
(S.C. 2009).
100 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971); see,
e.g., Ebron, 992 A.2d at 1215.
101 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693
(1984) ("The government is not responsible for, and hence not
able to prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a
conviction or sentence.').
102 United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981).
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contract negotiation does not always result in
a proper balancing of the various interests in-
volved. One major effect of Santobello has been
to dramatically increase the use of contract
theories in deciding plea negotiation cases. By
employing the term "specific performance" the
Court in Santobello invoked a well-established
area of law that attorneys and courts would
quickly begin to employ.1 03 The invocation of
this established body of law had several advan-
tages, the first of which is a body of principles,
i.e., contract law, for settling disputes. True,
contract law is a factual fit for plea bargaining
in many ways. First, like a contract, a plea bar-
gain rests on a theory of exchange. Defendants
exchange expensive procedural rights for a less
severe sentence or for a less severe charge. 104
Second, it grants trial courts the authority to
order specific performance as a remedy.10
However, as some scholars have pointed
out, the nature of a negotiation for a plea of
guilty is fundamentally different from the na-
ture of arm's length negotiation between par-
ties engaged in commercial enterprises.106 Du-
ress and conflicts of interest abound in plea
negotiations and are especially relevant in
considering claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Probably the most problematic differ-
ence is the pervasive existence of duress in
plea negotiations. 107 If a commercial negotia-
tor faces a bad deal, he can simply walk away.
With a criminal defendant, on the other hand,
the government can impose restrictions on his
liberty until a disposition is reached. 108 Fur-
ther, "[d]efendants who bargain for a plea serve
103 See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992).
104 Id. at 1913-16.
105 See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263.
106 See Emily Rubin, Note, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel and Guilty Pleas: Toward a Paradigm of Informed
Consent, 80 VA. L. REv. 1699, 1716-17 (1994); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979,
1986-90 (1992).
107 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 103, at 1919.
108 Id.; Paul Larkin, Public Choice Theory and
Overcriminalization, 36 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 715, 722
(2013).
lower sentences than those who do not."109 For
a defendant facing serious charges, a plea bar-
gain that dramatically reduces the prison time
he is likely to serve is often irresistible, regard-
less of the existence of suppressible evidence
or a better than fair possibility of acquittal af-
ter trial. 110 That is, unlike ordinary commercial
negotiation, plea negotiation is to some extent
inherently coercive.
A second problem with employing anal-
ogies to contract law in the plea negotiation
setting is that the institutions involved in guilty
plea negotiation create inherent conflicts of in-
terest."' Appointed attorneys are often paid a
low flat rate for each case.112 Thus, they have a
financial incentive to resolve the case quickly
through a guilty plea even if that course of ac-
tion may not be in their client's best interest.113
Public defenders may also be motivated to re-
solve cases quickly as they often work under
crushingly large caseloads.11" These constraints
may cause attorneys to exert pressure on defen-
dants to plead guilty." These problems mean a
criminal defendant is not as able to protect his
own interests as an ordinary economic actor.
Because of these problems, regulating plea bar-
gains under the same rubric as contract cases is
not appropriate.
Mandating specific performance or re-
instatement of the plea offer also confuses the
nature of the deprivation. As one court ob-
served:
To focus the remedy on the fore-
gone plea offer is to confuse the na-
ture of the injury suffered. Rather
than losing the benefit of the po-
tential plea bargain, the defendant
109 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 103, at 1951-52; Rubin,
supra note 106, at 1716-17.
110 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 103, at 1952 (citing
William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA.
L. REv. 761, at 830-31 (1989)); Rubin, supra note 106, at 1716-
17.
111
112
113
114
115
Schulhofer, supra note 106, at 1987-88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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has lost the effective assistance of
counsel to which he is constitution-
ally entitled. Thus, a restoration of
that counsel, rather than a mandat-
ed sentencing outcome, is the most
narrowly tailored way to address the
prejudice [.]116
B. Ordering a New Trial as a Remedy
Some observers have suggested that a
new trial is always the most appropriate rem-
edy." Nonetheless, the courts have criticized
this remedy. The main criticism has been that
a new trial does not eliminate the constitution-
al error because the constitutional error did
not occur during the trial.118 This reasoning is
flawed because when the court orders a new
trial, the parties do not proceed directly to jury
selection. Instead, the defendant again receives
an expensive set of procedural rights, which he
may later decide to exchange in a guilty plea
for sentencing concessions." 9 Thus, ordering a
new trial encourages the parties to return to the
negotiation phase the precise phase where
the constitutional error occurred. 120 Ordering
a new trial effectively turns the clock back to
before the constitutional deprivation. 121
On the other hand, the remedy of a new
trial allows for consideration of intervening
circumstances. Because the case will have to
be tried again, intervening circumstances, such
as the potential new crimes or the discovery of
new evidence, can be accounted for through
the ordinary process of negotiation. For these
reasons, the remedy of a new trial should be
favored, especially where the lost plea offer
contemplated conviction of different charges
116 Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800, 809- 10 (Colo.
2009).
117 David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal? Remedying
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Plea Bargaining, 120
YALE L.J- 1532, 1577 (2011).
118 See, e.g., Turner v. Tennessee, 858 E2d 1201, 1207-08
(6th Cir. 1988); Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W3d 791, 797-98 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2000); Osborne v. Kentucky, 992 S.W2d 860, 865 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1998).
119 See Perez, supra note 117, at 1555.
120 See, e.g., Riggs v. Fairman, 178 E Supp. 2d 1141, 1154
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
121 Perez, supra note 117, at 1553.
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from the charges of which the defendant was
ultimately convicted or where the ineffective-
ness of counsel involved a failure to convey a
plea offer.
At least one commentator has suggested
that an order of a new trial does not cure the
prejudice suffered by a defendant because of
the problem of overcharging or charge stack-
ing.12 Overcharging or charge stacking is the
practice of filing multiple charges or more se-
rious charges regarding a single event. Many
commentators condemn this practice because
it allows prosecutors to up the ante and coerce
defendants to enter plea agreements.123 This
practice should not be considered in determin-
ing the appropriate remedy for lost or rejected
plea bargains for a number of reasons. First,
prosecutors are ethically bound to not file
charges for which they do not believe there is
probable cause.124 For this reason, courts must
indulge a presumption that prosecutors charge
legitimately.125 Second, and more important-
ly, the principles of double jeopardy prevent
multiple punishments for the same offense. 126
Thus, if the defendant's conduct constitutes
more than one offense, it is more blameworthy.
To the extent that the available crimes listed in
the statues of the jurisdiction could allow more
punishment for a particular act than observers
believe is fair, the problem is not one of pros-
ecutorial overreaching, but rather one of leg-
islation and politics. 127 Finally, a prosecutors
122 See Gutierrez, supra note 43, at 709.
123 See, e.g., id.; see also William Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 594 (2010).
124 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a)
(2013) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall ... refrain
from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause.').
125 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464
(2008).
126 U.S. CONST. amend. V; United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 668, 695-96 (1993).
127 See Kyle Graham, Crimes, Widgets, and Plea
Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content, Pleas, and Trials,
100 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1627-29 (2012) (explaining why
analysis of the interaction between the substance of the charge
and the likelihood of a guilty plea should be considered when
adopting new criminal legislation); Stuntz, supra note 123,
at 579 (arguing that depoliticizing criminal law by taking the
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charging decision is ultimately backed by the
threat of a jury trial. After plea negotiations
fail, the defendant has all the protections the
Constitution affords, including the due process
right that his guilt be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. After a trial resulting in a guilty
verdict on all charges, any argument that the
prosecutor overcharged the case is merely an
argument that the legislature should not view
the conduct as blameworthy.
Unfortunately, as the Lafler Court recog-
nized, the cost of a new trial infringes on the
government's interest in the efficient admin-
istration of justice.128 This is why courts must
consider whether the proceedings following
the ineffective assistance of counsel involved a
guilty plea or a trial. If the subsequent pro-
ceedings involved a trial, the cost of a second
trial might be seen to unnecessarily infringe on
the government's interest. Contrariwise, if the
subsequent proceedings did not involve a trial,
the infringement on the government's interest
would be less.
C. Reoffering the Plea Agreement as a
Remedy
Forcing the government to reoffer the
plea agreement presents many of the same ad-
vantages of an order of a new trial. Like an
order of a new trial, it forces the parties back
to the negotiation phase. Unlike the order of
a new trial, however, it unnecessarily discounts
consideration of intervening factors, which the
Court in Lafler specifically mentioned. 129 For
example, if a defendant were convicted of a
more serious offense after trial than the offense
to which the plea offer would have allowed him
to plead guilty to, allowing the defendant the
benefit of the plea offer not only ignores the
cost of the trial, but also ignores the fact that
the defendant has been proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt of a more serious offense
and is consequently more deserving of punish-
ment. Furthermore. "[forcing the prosecu-
power to define crimes away from the legislatures is the only
way to solve the problem of over-inclusive criminal codes).
128 See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388-89.
129 Id. at 1389.
tion to reoffer a plea bargain that it initially of-
fered to avoid the expense and risk of trial that
it has already won would violate basic fairness
principles enshrined in the separation of pow-
ers doctrine."3 0 Thus, this remedy should be
avoided.
D. Resentencing as a Remedy
Resentencing is attractive because it
avoids the necessity of expending additional
resources, especially where there has been a
trial." On the other hand, this remedy would
not be appropriate in a case involving charge-
bargaining, i.e., the practice of dismissing some
charges of a multi-count charging document
in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea to
the remaining charges. That is because resen-
tencing assumes guilt has been determined
correctly on all the charges in the case. In the
case of charge bargaining, the government may
have relinquished some charges it could have
proved, so it cannot be assumed that guilt was
appropriately determined. 132
In sum, the framework for determin-
ing a remedy after a criminal defendant has
received ineffective assistance of counsel dur-
ing plea negotiation should involve a balancing
test. The court must balance the defendant's
interest in vindicating his right to effective as-
sistance of counsel against the government's
interest in the efficient administration of jus-
tice. In this test, the government's interest is
weighed by looking at the nature of the subse-
quent proceedings and the defendant's inter-
est is weighed by looking at his or her actions
during plea negotiation. If the government's
interests are more weighty, i.e., where there has
been a trial resulting in a finding of guilt on all
charges or on more charges than contemplated
in the lost plea offer, the error should be con-
sidered harmless and the defendant should not
be afforded a remedy. If the defendant's inter-
ests are more weighty, i.e., where there was a
subsequent guilty plea to more serious charges
130 Perez, supra note 117, at 1551.
131 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
132 See id. at 1389.
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than contemplated in the lost plea offer, the de-
fendant should be afforded resentencing or a
new trial.
V Conclusion
The decisions in Frye and Lafler were im-
portant, not because they were unexpected, but
because the Supreme Court began to recognize
that our system of criminal justice is adminis-
trative in nature and announced rules that re-
flect this circumstance. The decisions, however,
stopped short of what was necessary. Instead
of precisely addressing the issue of remedy, the
Court simply gave two possible factors without
clear guidance on how to weigh each one. Most
importantly, the Court overlooked how the na-
ture of subsequent proceedings can affect the
relative interests of the parties. By looking at
prior lower court cases that have already ad-
dressed the Lafler question, practitioners can
see how the factors enunciated in Lafler should
be weighed. A balancing test which would
mandate a new trial when the defendant's in-
terests are weightier, while leaving open the
possibility of no remedy or only resentencing
when the government's interest is weightier is
the best way to vindicate the defendants' right
to counsel without unfairly infringing on soci-
ety's interest in the efficient administration of
criminal justice.
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